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Introduction 
 
The timely convening of this collaborative examination of s 223 of the Native Title 
Act 1993 (Cth) no doubt reflects the view now shared by many that Australian 
native title has become unacceptably mired in technicality, expense and confusion.  
It is dismaying to find more and more Indigenous Australians, and Australian 
lawyers generally, resigning themselves to the fact that the native title doctrine has 
proven incapable of providing principled answers to the most important of the 
post-colonial legal questions, and turning their attention and efforts elsewhere.  
Hopefully this project will help to identify a means by which we can extract 
Australian native title law and policy from its current confusion and pedantry – 
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 recover the broader picture and possibility from the difficulty and detail to which 
we have descended.        
 
The sharp focus of the topics assigned for examination here suggests that we are in 
fact now locking in on the primary sources of the contemporary problems, which it 
seems do not lie in the crowded technical alleyways and disreputable political 
bargains of the current Native Title Act 1993 (Cth), but rather in the very 
conceptual foundations of the Australian doctrine.  These foundations were left 
largely untouched by the legislation, except for what is said in s 223 – the target of 
this project.  When enacted this provision was on its surface a brief, simply-
worded and precedentially-supported statutory definition of the newly discovered 
Indigenous entitlement.   So what then is the source of the fundamental difficulties 
that now entangle the Australian law – difficulties that have become very much 
associated with the terms of s 223?   
 
The explicit focus of the Australian native title doctrine is the identification and 
legal translation of Indigenous ‘laws and customs’ relating to land occupation and 
usage.  There may still be scope to re-agitate the appropriateness of a ‘laws and 
customs’ focus, with reference to the North American legal heritage.  However, 
the starting point for the analysis in this paper is that the ‘laws and customs’ 
framework, properly applied, can be sound in principle and practice.  The notion 
of pre-existing ‘law and custom’ is logically antecedent to the idea of surviving 
rights, interests, title or property.  And this ‘law and custom’ focus in the 
identification and definition of the surviving entitlement provides some legal 
orderliness and legitimacy to the process, begins with an appropriate 
acknowledgement of the Indigenous perspective, and may help to ensure accuracy 
and appropriate flexibility.  Moreover, close comparative examination indicates 
that the ‘law and custom’ focus is implicit in much of the relevant Indigenous 
rights jurisprudence across the key comparative jurisdictions.
2
  Indeed it would 
seem to indicate that indeed the Australian courts’ careful articulation of this 
emphasis is an important contribution to the post-‘scale of social organisation’3 
conceptual development, and one that has helped to prompt clarification 
elsewhere.
4
 
 
More to the point for the analysis in this paper, is it then the addition of the word 
‘traditional’ to the notion of ‘laws and customs’ that leads the Australian doctrine 
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 to uncertainty, technicality, and results that are inconsistent and controversial?  
This is certainly a word that has dominated Australian native title law and policy – 
carving itself a central place in explanations of both the survival of the native title 
interest (proof) and its definition (content).  Yet it is the contention in this paper 
that while the amorphous language of ‘tradition’ does pose problems, it need not 
necessarily consign us to the complexity and confusion that have afflicted the 
Australian doctrine.  This is so even if it is accepted that the notion of ‘tradition’ is 
inextricably tied to pre-sovereignty circumstances and concepts of generational 
transmission
5
 – on the arguments here these matters are not the source of the 
malady.  
 
It seems that the principal difficulties, admittedly encouraged by the overtones of 
the language, arise from the courts’ frequent adoption of an overly microscoping 
approach to the composite notion of ‘traditional laws and customs’ – which 
manifests itself in a tendency to over-specificity in the definition of the native title 
interest and (perhaps correlatively) over-particularity as regards the cultural 
continuity required for its survival.  This imposes a serious historically-based 
confinement of native title content, and converts the logical condition of non-
abandonment into an illogical ‘survival of lifestyle’ requirement.  Even putting 
aside for the moment the broader implications of these constrictions, as a simple 
matter of legal practicality the inherent uncertainty and awkwardness in the idea of 
‘tradition’
6
 (a notion on which the High Court has been able to provide only scant 
guidance
7
) are greatly exacerbated when the standard is pressed too closely to 
sophisticated and necessarily adaptive cultures.   
 
The Australian courts appear to acknowledge the inevitability of change in 
Indigenous societies. There has been express reference to the reality and/or 
acceptability of such change in various decisions,
8
 and attempts to find some 
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 accommodation for it even within the strict methodology.
9
  However, this 
proffered flexibility has failed to mature into consistent and coherent principles.  
And as long as the inherently inflexible microscoped ‘tradition’-focus prevails, it 
will remain more rhetorical than real.  
 
This paper will explore the notion of ‘tradition’ and the assembly of the doctrinal 
microscope in Australian native title law – examining the Mabo legacy, the terms 
of s 223 of the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth), the development and theoretical 
‘backfilling’ of the strict approach in the post-Mabo jurisprudence, and the 
resulting contemporary confusion and controversy.   It will argue that there is a 
non-jarring solution at hand, one that organises the existing dissenting views
10
 into 
a viable alternative.  This is, essentially, the de-particularisation of the Australian 
methodology - via proper respect for the possible existence of a comprehensive 
traditional title and acknowledgement that the varying minutiae of cultural 
practices may logically have little bearing on the survival of a continuously 
asserted traditional ‘ownership’ or ‘custodianship’ of territory.  Under this 
approach the notion of ‘tradition’ can retain its central selection role, both 
terminologically and structurally, but the attendant legal and factual difficulties 
will be much reduced. 
 
At the outset it might be emphasised that the process of remedying the Australian 
troubles will be a difficult one.  A number of the well-chosen topics for this 
project on s 223 represent interlocking and mutually reinforcing problems in the 
Australian doctrine.  The notion of ‘traditional laws and customs’ is enshrined in s 
223 with attendant structural and conceptual ambiguity that invites a strict and 
pedantic approach to that notion.  That strict approach in turn provokes and/or 
permeates the other inquiries (into ‘society’, ‘system’ and ‘connection’).  And 
these other inquiries, so shaped, in turn provide theoretical justification for a 
specific examination of ‘traditional laws and customs’.  The tools to begin 
unraveling this hazardous conceptual circle are close by - significant progress 
could be triggered by a proper exploration of the Canadian differentiation
11
 of 
‘rights’ and ‘title’, and by clear and consistent acknowledgement of the conceptual 
difference between inquiries into communal interests and inquiries into the inter se 
division of those interests.
12
  These are the primary tools of de-particularisation, 
tools that can free communal title claims from the necessary specificity of 
considerations relevant to specific rights and inter se rights.   
                                                                                                               
(1988) at 119; Faulkner v Tauranga District Council [1996] 1 NZLR 357 at 365-6; cf United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (see A/RES/61/295), Arts 3, 4, 21, 23, 26, 31-32. 
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11  Note particularly Delgamuukw v British Columbia (1997) 153 DLR (4th) 193. 
12  Note the identification of the two distinctions (in various contexts) in the work of, eg, Noel 
Pearson, Kent McNeil, Richard Bartlett, Hal Wootten, Lisa Strelein and Gary Myers. 
 A number of prominent commentators
13
 and judges
14
 have pursued aspects of 
these problems, and possible solutions, through the Australian and contemporary 
Canadian legal history.  Notable amongst them are the contributors to this project - 
particularly Noel Pearson, Lisa Strelein, Justice North and Kent McNeil.  Richard 
Bartlett has also written extensively on the topic.  The key problems are all on the 
agenda in this project.  It has the potential to contribute significantly to the final 
theoretical dismantling of the tightly wound and unworkable Australian native title 
methodology.                     
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The pre-Section 223 landscape: Mabo (No2) 
 
The nuances and finer detail of the seminal Mabo (No 2)
15
 decision have been lost, 
to some extent, in 15 odd years of insistently selective quoting from particular 
pronouncements by Brennan J.  This is a suitable occasion to recover some of the 
lost context, and re-assess the meaning of the Mabo (No 2) decision from the 
perspective of the tangled confusion in the contemporary Australian doctrine.   
 
Brennan J’s enduring comments in Mabo (No 2) (as later reflected in the wording 
of the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth)) were laced with emphasis upon the source of 
native title in ‘traditional laws acknowledged’ and ‘traditional customs observed’ - 
and upon the importance of those traditional laws and customs to the definition of 
the interest and its survival.
16
  Yet not far below this familiar surface of the 
decision there was significant ambiguity, inconsistency and even majority division 
on the methodology and standards being laid down.  The unsettled nature of these 
jurisprudential foundations was not immediately obvious, except to the more 
visionary Australian commentators and comparative academics,
17
 and was for 
some time largely buried under the rush for clarification on commercially and 
politically pressing questions about extinguishment and interaction of rights.  Yet 
with a contemporary focus sharpened by experience and deep doctrinal confusion, 
we can now see that the hidden uncertainties in the Mabo treatise were major ones.    
 
The very language of ‘tradition’, which has since dominated the Australian 
doctrine, was in itself ambiguous in Mabo (No 2).  It might first be noted that the 
word ‘traditional’ was used in varying ways throughout the decision, often without 
any intimation of qualitative cultural assessment.  On many occasions it was 
simply an unimportant explanatory pointer in discussions of the relevant history 
(essentially meaning pre-sovereignty, pre-annexation or pre-existing).
18
  Elsewhere 
it was used simply as a synonym for ‘Aboriginal’, ‘ancestral’, ‘historical’ or ‘long-
held’19 – often with no apparent purpose beyond that of distinguishing the native 
title entitlements under consideration from general system property entitlements.  
Some examples can illustrate the significance of context here: the phrase 
‘traditional inhabitants’ need not mean ‘inhabitants living traditionally’; 
‘traditional rights’ is quite distinct from ‘rights to traditional uses’; and ‘traditional 
lands’ is not the same as ‘lands used traditionally’.  Most importantly however, as 
the mounting difficulties in the later cases clearly illustrate, even when a more 
                                                 
15  Mabo v Queensland (No 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1. 
16  See esp Mabo v Queensland (No 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1 per Brennan J at 57, 58, 59-60, 70. 
17  See the earlier of the works cited in footnotes above. 
18  See eg Deane and Gaudron JJ at 81, 85, 99, 100, 105, 106, 109, 115-16, Dawson J at 141. Cf Brennan J 
at 29, 39, 57, 58, 62, Toohey J at 178. 
19  See eg Brennan J at 68, Mason CJ and McHugh J at 15, Deane and Gaudron JJ at 77, 81, 85, 86, 92, 
93, 94, 100, 106, 109, 115, Dawson J at 141, Toohey J at 190, 192.  
 substantive meaning is attributed to the use of the word ‘traditional’ in particular 
parts of the Mabo (No 2) decision, the term in itself offers no clear qualitative or 
temporal standards and might in fact be understood to readily accommodate 
processes of change.
20
  
 
The expression ‘law and custom’ also carries ambiguity21 – particularly if it is 
accepted that the primary difficulty in the Australian doctrine resides in 
uncertainty over the level of particularity at which the claimants’ circumstances 
are to be assessed.  Apart from some slight intimation of specificity in the frequent 
use of the plural version of the phrase (which can be otherwise explained), and in 
the very inclusion of the idea of ‘custom’ and its ‘observance’ (which can also be 
otherwise explained), the phrase ‘laws and customs’ in truth says little about the 
exact nature and particularity of the legal inquiry involved.  Similar ambiguity 
resides in the terms ‘observe’ and ‘acknowledge’ (and ‘connection’ – also very 
present in Brennan J’s judgment).  The uncertainty is exacerbated, particularly in 
Brennan J’s key passages, by the grouping together of communal and inter se 
interests and the lack of close attention to the possible distinction between ‘rights’ 
and ‘title’.  Logically there might be quite different inquiries involved for each 
context, and although it must be conceded that such structural clarity has proven 
elusive in a number of jurisdictions,
22
 the overly generic language has proven to be 
particularly costly in Australia.  
 
These basic terminological problems are significant, however the ambiguity in 
Mabo (No 2) in respect of the matters examined in this paper extends much 
further.  Take first the issue of content.  The notion that Mabo (No 2) stands for the 
proposition that the native title interest in Australia is necessarily defined by 
reference to specific historical laws, customs and practices is difficult to reconcile 
with some important aspects of the case: 
 the result in the decision (a recognition of something apparently akin to 
un-delimited communal ownership);
23
 
                                                 
20  See eg Deane and Gaudron JJ at 110.  And note in this context Graeme Neate, ‘Turning Back the 
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paper delivered at Native Title Conference 2002 – Outcomes and Possibilities (3 Sept 2002, Geraldton, 
WA) at 16ff; Bruce Rigsby, ‘Custom and Tradition: Innovation and Invention’ (2006) 6 Macquarie 
Law Journal 113. 
21  Compare Richard H Bartlett, ‘The Source, Content and Proof of Native Title at Common Law’ in 
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‘The Common Law Construct of Native Title: A “re-feudalisation” of Australian land law’ (1999) 8 
Griffith Law Review 50 at 70.   Cf Noel Pearson, ‘204 Years of Invisible Title’ in MA Stephenson and 
Suri Ratnapala (eds), Mabo: A Judicial Revolution (UQP, Brisbane, 1993) 75 at 82 (where the absence 
of the term ‘ownership’ in the court’s determination was considered to be a cause for concern). 
  various indications that the majority judges all acknowledged, more 
generally, the possible existence of a comprehensive ‘title’ interest;24  and 
 the fact that there was very limited explicit backing for a strict and specific 
approach – really only in the Baker Lake-influenced comments of 
Toohey J
25
 and in the dissenting judge Dawson J’s brief reference to other 
(now overruled) Canadian decisions.
26
  
 
On the topic of proof, Mabo (No 2)’s supposed support for the proposition that the 
survival of native title depends upon constancy and continuity in particularised 
historical laws, customs and practices is also questionable in light of various 
features of the case: 
 the result (a recognition of subsisting title in the hands of a strongly land-
connected and historically stable but quite adapted community);
27
 
 the express rejection of such a requirement by Toohey J28 and the strong 
doubts expressed on the point by Deane and Gaudron JJ;
29
 and 
 the ambiguity underlying Brennan J’s own ostensible support for a strict 
approach, namely: 
o the ameliorating terminology he employed (at various points he 
required only that customs be observed ‘so far as practicable’, that the 
laws and customs acknowledged and observed be ‘based on’ the 
traditions of the group, and that the traditional connection be 
‘substantially maintained’); 30 
o the shifting emphasis in his various statements of relevant principle 
(eg in places he noted the adaptive nature of ‘laws and customs’ 
and/or spoke in terms of a need just for survival of the ‘general nature’ 
of the connection);
31
  
o his disinterest in attempting any concerted application of a strict 
requirement to the facts of the case;
32
 and  
o the fact that his stronger intimations of a strict approach appeared to 
be chiefly an unnecessary attempt to garner theoretical support for the 
inalienability of native title.
33
 
 
                                                 
24  See eg Brennan J at 51-2, 60-1; Toohey J at 207, 214; Deane and Gaudron JJ at 88, 89, 92, 93.   
25  See Toohey J at 178-9, 184, 187-8.  See also Hamlet of Baker Lake v Minister of Indian Affairs and 
Northern Development (1979) 107 DLR (3d) 513 – a lower court Canadian decision carrying 
overtones of content confinement. 
26  Dawson J at 129, 132, 160, 169. 
27  See particularly the comments of Toohey J at 192; Dawson J at 157. 
28  See Toohey J at 192. 
29  See Deane and Gaudron JJ at 110. 
30  See eg Brennan J at 57, 58, 59-60, 61, 70. 
31  See eg Brennan J at 61, 70. 
32  See Brennan J at 60-1, 69.  
33  For detailed discussion of this point see Simon Young, The Trouble with Tradition: Native Title and 
Cultural Change (Federation Press, NSW, 2008), pp 261ff. 
 In addition to these immediate matters, there is much in the broader legal and 
factual context surrounding the Mabo (No 2) decision that is too rarely visited in 
contemporary legal analysis.  The emphasis and terminology of the decision, to the 
extent that it some exacting focus on specific ‘tradition’, is best understood against 
its original setting.  For example, the Court’s initial extrication of Australian law 
from the existing Australian and Privy Council precedent (to open the possibility 
of native title recognition) in various ways prompted attention to the specifics of 
the Meriam people’s ‘laws and customs’.  Most notably, Brennan J’s starting point 
and major concern was to reject the ‘absence of law’ theory of pre-settlement 
Australia and the misclassification of Indigenous peoples in such territories as 
‘low in the scale of social organisation’.34  Also, the atypical context of the Mabo 
claim encouraged a focus in tone and inquiry on the clear inter se rights within the 
community (and hence on particular, sub-communal ‘laws and customs’).35  And 
moreover, this case presented to the court a quite unique community history (of 
relatively uninterrupted small plot cultivation
36
) against which a terminologically 
pedantic emphasis on ‘tradition’ would seem to be of little consequence.  Initially 
the best of test cases (for obvious reasons), Mabo (No 2) in its application to the 
very different Australian mainland became an awkward precedent.   
 
In summary, it is hard to defend a strict and specific ‘tradition’-focussed approach 
to native title on the basis of the original Mabo (No 2) decision.  That decision, 
properly examined, contains only limited and ambiguous support for a strict 
methodology, and much of that support can be explained and rationalised by 
reference to the surrounding context.  Unfortunately, whatever the true meaning of 
the decision, the language and emphasis of key passages in the judgments placed 
the ‘tradition’ preoccupation within easy reach of the hurriedly emerging 
Australian doctrine. 
 
 
Section 223 – Statutory Enshrinement of Ambiguity 
 
The Native Title Act 1993 (Cth), passed some 18 months after the Mabo (No 2) 
decision, contains a statutory definition of ‘native title’ that is the central focus of 
this project.  Sub-sections (1) and (2) are in the following terms: 
223(1) The expression native title or native title rights and interests means the 
communal, group or individual rights and interests of Aboriginal peoples or 
Torres Strait Islanders in relation to land or waters, where:  
(a) the rights and interests are possessed under the traditional laws ack-
nowledged, and the traditional customs observed, by the Aboriginal 
peoples or Torres Strait Islanders; and  
                                                 
34  See eg Brennan J at 33, 37-38, 39ff, 45, 58. 
35  Note particularly on this point the arguments of Noel Pearson, and see further Simon Young, The 
Trouble with Tradition: Native Title and Cultural Change (Federation Press, NSW, 2008), pp 256ff.  
36  See Brennan J at 33, 37-8; Toohey J at 189;  
 (b) the Aboriginal peoples or Torres Strait Islanders, by those laws and cus-
toms, have a connection with the land or waters; and  
(c) the rights and interests are recognised by the common law of Australia. 
(2) Without limiting subsection (1), ‘rights and interests’ in that section includes 
hunting, gathering, or fishing, rights and interests. 
  
This provision has played an important role in the development and dominance of 
a specific ‘tradition’ focus in Australia – initially as a very visible and dangerously 
clipped translation of the common law principles, and ultimately it seems as an 
independent foundation for the strict approach.  The precise way in which the 
section has been used by courts is explored further below.  However, a number of 
immediate observations can be made about the terms of s 223 from the perspective 
of the arguments in this paper.  
 
Clearly s 223 provides superficial support to the stricter ‘tradition’ focus, 
principally by perpetuating the ambiguity of certain passages from Mabo (No 2).
37
  
The section adopts the awkward and uncertain language of ‘tradition’,38 in a 
manner that suggests there is a need for a historically-referenced definition of the 
contemporary native title interest and a requirement of constancy (if not 
continuity) in relevant law and custom.  Further, both sub-ss (1) and (2) intimate 
that there is need for specificity in the definition of the Aboriginal interests.
39
  
Perhaps most importantly however, s 223 groups communal and inter se 
entitlements together and fails to acknowledge any rights v title distinction
40
 – 
thereby obscuring any possible differentiation between the various inquiries and 
drawing communal title claims into a framework that is phrased to accommodate 
the necessary particularity of investigations into individual and specific rights-type 
claims.  
 
It is immediately obvious that the terms of s 223(1)(a) and (b) draw heavily upon 
particular statements from the judgment of Brennan J in Mabo (No 2).  On one 
view this could be read as a legislative preference for the approach of Brennan J
41
 
(to the extent that the majority judgments contained differences).
42
  Whether or not 
that is an appropriate interpretation, the critical point is that the provision extracts 
Brennan J’s comments from the broader legal and factual context43 (briefly 
                                                 
37  Compare the comments in Commonwealth v Yarmirr (1999) 101 FCR 171 per Beaumont and 
von Doussa JJ at 191. 
38  See also the emphasis in relevant parliamentary debates: Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, 
House of Representatives, 16 November 1993, at 2879. 
39  Compare also the early parts of s 225. 
40  Compare the comments in Ward v Western Australia (1998) 159 ALR 483 per Lee J at 505. 
41  Compare Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria (2001) 110 FCR 244 per 
Branson and Katz JJ at 282-4.  
42  Cf Lisa Strelein, Compromised Jurisprudence (Aboriginal Studies Press, Canberra, 2006) at 110. 
43  Compare the comments on the statutory use of the word ‘connection’ in Northern Territory v 
Alyawarr, Kaytetye, Warumungu, Wakaya Native Title Claim Group [2005] FCAFC 135 at [87]. 
 explored above) that is vital to a full understanding of his Honour’s judgment.44  
Viewed in this way, clearly s 223 is an over-simplification even of Brennan J’s 
approach alone, and invites a hazardous neglect of the less-visited corners of the 
Mabo (No 2) decision. 
 
At the end of the day however, and this is a point of considerable practical 
importance, the wording of s 223 does not necessarily entrench a strict and 
specific ‘tradition’ focus.45  In the first place, s 223 actually says very little about 
the content of native title.  It does not deny the possibility that the relevant 
‘traditional laws and customs’ may have recognised and supported an exclusive 
and comprehensive relationship with the land,
46
 and it does not necessarily confine 
the contemporary interest to a collection of specifically identified and proven 
historical uses.
47
  Secondly, to the extent that the section requires some constancy 
(and perhaps continuity) of laws and customs, there is nothing that demands 
constancy and continuity of particularised laws and customs.  The traditional 
principle needed to survive to support the claimed interest might still, in the case 
of a ‘title’ properly recognised, be a non-particular one – ie the traditionally-based 
assertion of ownership or custodianship – such that the requirement of continuity 
is a logically tailored version of the notion of non-abandonment.
48
  It is true that a 
‘connection’ by traditional laws and customs must apparently be maintained under 
the section, but why should this additional stipulation necessarily force a 
particularisation of the law and custom required to survive – particularly given that 
a mere ‘spiritual’ connection can apparently be sufficient connection?49  
 
This reading of s 223 goes some way towards reconciling the Australian statutory 
definition of native title with settled comparative methodology.
50
  Furthermore, as 
the above examination of Mabo (No 2) hopefully helps to demonstrate, this 
reading of s 223 also provides a more accurate translation of that decision.  
                                                 
44  Note also that a close reading of Brennan J’s judgment reveals that in the crucial passages his 
Honour was possibly referring simply to the Aboriginal interest as at the time of acquisition of 
sovereignty (rather than as at the time of claim). This casts further doubt on the suitability of these 
passages for codification – particularly given the different emphasis adopted where his Honour 
turns to directly address contemporary claims.  
45  The one point on which this author would take issue with the clear text of s 223 is its suggestion 
that contemporary inter se rights within a community are determined by reference to ‘traditional’ 
laws and customs.  For an argument that such rights should be ascertained by reference to a 
community’s contemporary laws and customs, see Simon Young, The Trouble with Tradition: Native 
Title and Cultural Change (Federation Press, NSW, 2008), esp chap 15. 
46  Compare the comments in Neowarra v Western Australia (2003) 205 ALR 145, esp at [368], [382]-
[383]. 
47  Compare H Wootten, ‘Mabo – Issues and Challenges’ (1994) 1 Judicial Review 303 at 338. 
48  Cf Richard H Bartlett, ‘An Obsession with Traditional Laws and Customs Creates Difficulty 
Establishing Native Title Claims in the South: Yorta Yorta’ (2003) 31 University of Western Australia 
Law Review 35 at 41. 
49  See also the detailed analysis of the notion of ‘connection’ in Monika Ciolek, ‘Exploring 
Connection: Judicial Interpretations of Section 223(1)(b) of the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth)’ (2006) 10 
Australian Indigenous Law Reporter 14.  
50  Relevant comparative developments are analysed in Simon Young, The Trouble with Tradition: 
Native Title and Cultural Change (Federation Press, NSW, 2008), pt II (see particularly the summary 
in chap 7). 
 Viewed in that light, this broader interpretation becomes compelling – finding 
support in: 
 the conventional understanding51 that s 223 was essentially an adoption of 
the common law concept of ‘native title’ (at least as regards proof and 
content);
52
 
 traditional legal presumptions regarding non-alteration of the common 
law
53
 and non-interference with vested rights and interests (particularly 
property rights
54
 and Aboriginal rights
55
); 
 the many statements emphasising the need for a liberal interpretation of 
the Native Title Act;
56
  
 principles as to the interpretation of statutes according to context and 
purpose;
57
 and  
 the calls by some judges for the resolution of legislative ambiguities by 
reference to fundamental principles of human rights (including non-
discrimination).
58
  
 
                                                 
51  See eg Mason v Tritton (1994) 34 NSWLR 572 per Priestley JA at 599-600; Dillon v Davies (1998) 8 
Tas R 229 per Underwood J at 233, 236; Western Australia v Commonwealth (1995) 183 CLR 373 per 
joint majority at 452; Ward v Western Australia (1998) 159 ALR 483 per Lee J at 505; Commonwealth v 
Yarmirr (1999) 101 FCR 171 per Merkel J at 258ff (and the references cited there).  See also the 
detailed discussion of this issue (albeit in a different context) in Commonwealth v Yarmirr (2001) 
184 ALR 113 per McHugh J at 152-60 (particularly the emphasis upon Senate discussions); cf 
Kirby J at 179, 183-4, 196-7, 198; Callinan J at 206, 212.  And see further Western Australia v Ward 
(2002) 213 CLR 1 per Callinan J at [629], [650] and cf Kirby J at [566]; Members of the Yorta Yorta 
Aboriginal Community v Victoria (2001) 110 FCR 244 per Branson and Katz JJ at [113], [123] and 
Black CJ at [32]; and more recently Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria 
(2002) 214 CLR 422 per Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Hayne JJ at [75], [76] (and Callinan J at [177]).  
Note the apparent circularity of reasoning in the comments of Gleeson CJ etc in Yorta Yorta, and 
particularly the assertion that there is no ‘body of common law’ defining native title rights and 
interests nor ‘common law elements for [their] establishment’ (cf Gaudron and Kirby JJ at [112] 
and Callinan J at [185], contrast McHugh J at [129]ff). The intention of Gleeson CJ etc here was 
apparently to emphasise that the focus of inquiry is ‘traditional law and custom’ and the Act, but 
these technical comments would appear not to have been intended to derogate from the assertion 
that the Act is designed to recognise and protect the Mabo conceptualisation of ‘native title’.   
52  See eg Commonwealth v Yarmirr (2001) 184 ALR 113 per Kirby J at 179-80, 182, 183-4; 
Commonwealth v Yarmirr (1999) 101 FCR 171 per Merkel J at 266; Members of the Yorta Yorta 
Aboriginal Community v Victoria (2001) 110 FCR 244 per Branson and Katz JJ at [123].  Cf the 
suggestion that there had in fact been a statutory relaxation of the common law principles as 
regards the point of inquiry: Commonwealth v Yarmirr (1999) 101 FCR 171 per Beaumont and 
von Doussa JJ. 
53  See eg Wik Peoples v Queensland (1996) 187 CLR 1 per Gaudron J at 151 (and cf Gummow J at 171), 
quoting from American Dairy Queen (Qld) Pty Ltd v Blue Rio Pty Ltd (1981) 147 CLR 677 per Mason 
J.  Cf however the comments in Gumana v Northern Territory [2007] FCAFC 23 at [96]. 
54  See eg Western Australia v Ward (2002) 213 CLR 1 per Kirby J at [567]. 
55  See eg Western Australia v Commonwealth (1995) 183 CLR 373 per joint majority at 433; Wik Peoples v 
Queensland (1996) 187 CLR 1 per Kirby J at 248 (quoting with apparent approval from Canadian 
precedent).  See also Commonwealth v Yarmirr (2001) 184 ALR 113 per Kirby J at 187. 
56  See eg Commonwealth v Yarmirr (2001) 184 ALR 113 per McHugh J at 150-1; Western Australia v 
Ward (2002) 213 CLR 1 per Kirby J at [587]. 
57  See eg Western Australia v Ward (2002) 213 CLR 1 per McHugh J at [480] (in the context of pastoral 
lease legislation). 
58  See eg Western Australia v Ward (2002) 213 CLR 1 per Kirby J at [566]-[567]. 
 In the High Court’s later forays into the field of native title, it became gradually 
more insistent that the statute is the main point of reference in these matters.
59
 This 
appeared to be fueled by particular concerns, such as the need to extend native title 
under the statute beyond any geographical limits on the common law
60
 and the 
rejection of lower court attempts at one point to apply pre-1998 amendment (and 
hence pre-confirmation regime) statutory law.
61
  However, the statutory focus has 
been extended it seems to the issues under examination in this paper (as will be 
explored further below).
62
  
 
Yet it is important to note in the context of this strengthening statutory focus that 
the Native Title Act itself lends weight to the argument for the broader 
interpretation of s 223 – for example in its express subjugation (at least in the case 
of ambiguity) to the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth)
63
 and in the relevantly 
broad terms of s 225 (which explains what is required in a native title 
‘determination’).  In any event, the court’s insistence on careful attention to the 
terms of s 223 does not resolve the patent ambiguity in the provision, nor erase the 
important jurisprudential background.
64
  Even the very statute-focused joint 
majority in the Ward decision acknowledged that account may be taken of cases 
such as Mabo (No 2) and Wik when considering the meaning and effect of the 
Native Title Act.
65
  
 
Armed with a fuller and more properly contextualised understanding of Mabo 
(No 2) (and hence an awareness of the over-simplicity of s 223), the argument for 
a broader reading of s 223 becomes difficult to ignore.  If the provision can bear 
only the strict and specific ‘tradition’-focused meaning, it begins to look like an 
                                                 
59  See eg Commonwealth v Yarmirr (2001) 184 ALR 113 per joint judgment at 119, 122, Kirby J at 179-
80, 182, 183-4, Callinan J at 206; Western Australia v Ward (2002) 213 CLR 1 per joint majority at [1]-
[2], [4], [16], [468]; Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria (2002) 214 CLR 422 
per Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Hayne JJ at [9], [70], [75], cf [76], and cf Gaudron and Kirby JJ at 
[112], Callinan J at [177]. 
60  See Commonwealth v Yarmirr (2001) 184 ALR 113. 
61  See Western Australia v Ward (2002) 213 CLR 1 eg at [26]. 
62  See eg Western Australia v Ward (2002) 213 CLR 1 per joint majority at [14]; Members of the Yorta 
Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria (2002) 214 CLR 422 per Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Hayne JJ 
at [31], [32], cf [40].  See further below. 
63  The relevant provision, s 7 of the Native Title Act, was substantially diluted in 1998. Yet s 7(2)(b) in 
the new version still provides: ‘to construe this Act, and thereby to determine its operation, 
ambiguous terms should be construed consistently with the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 if that 
construction would remove the ambiguity’.    
64  Cf the comments in Commonwealth v Yarmirr (1999) 101 FCR 171 per Beaumont and von Doussa JJ 
at 191. 
65  Western Australia v Ward (2002) 213 CLR 1 at [16], [25].  Cf De Rose v South Australia (2003) 133 FCR 
325 at [158]; De Rose v South Australia (No 2) [2005] FCAFC 110; Northern Territory v Alyawarr, 
Kaytetye, Warumungu, Wakaya Native Title Claim Group [2005] FCAFC 135 at [92]; Griffiths v 
Northern Territory [2006] FCA 903 at [517], [531], [594]. 
 artificial parallel version of these fundamental Indigenous rights
66
 (or perhaps even 
a serious accidental restraint upon them).  
 
 
The Formative Post-Mabo Cases 
 
As noted earlier, after Mabo (No 2) issues of extinguishment were the immediate 
focus of native title litigation in Australia.  There was for some time only isolated 
attention to the more fundamental issues under examination here, and there was no 
direct consideration of these matters by the High Court until its decisions in 
Ward
67
 and Yorta Yorta.
68
  However, the development of a strict and specific 
‘tradition’ emphasis did proceed, quietly, in the formative decisions.   
 
Certainly the language of ‘tradition’ dominated the promulgation of the Mabo 
doctrine.  As seen above it was seized upon in the drafting of the Native Title Act, 
and it wound its way insistently through the arguments
69
 and judgments
70
 in the 
post-Mabo (No 2) case law.  As in Mabo (No 2) itself, many of the references to 
‘tradition’ were innocuous, however this general undiscerning emphasis inevitably 
encouraged the stricter thinking.   
 
The development of the tight ‘tradition’-focus was also encouraged by the 
continuing selective treatment of Mabo (No 2) in the later cases (prompted in part 
by the selectivity of the Native Title Act provisions), by other aspects of the tone 
                                                 
66  Compare the comments in Commonwealth v Yarmirr (2001) 184 ALR 113 per McHugh J at 160-1.  
As to the potentially ongoing role of the general courts in recognising and protecting native title, 
see Western Australia v Ward (2002) 213 CLR 1 per joint majority at [21]. 
67  Western Australia v Ward (2002) 213 CLR 1. 
68  Members of Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria (2002) 214 CLR 422. 
69  See eg Western Australia v Commonwealth (1995) 183 CLR 373 at 415; Mason v Tritton (1994) 34 
NSWLR 572 at 585, 595-6, 601; Wik Peoples v Queensland (1996) 187 CLR 1 at 6-10, 12, 13, 19, 20, 24, 
33, 45, 53, 55, 60, 101, 102; Derschaw v Sutton (1997) 17 WAR 419 at 438, 439; Fejo v Northern 
Territory (1998) 195 CLR 96 at 98, 100-1, 102, 113-14; Wilkes v Johnsen (1999) 21 WAR 269 at 283; 
Commonwealth v Yarmirr (2001) 184 ALR 113 at 140, 144; Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Com-
munity v Victoria (2002) 214 CLR 422 at [17]ff. 
70  For examples of the many relevant passages, see Western Australia v Commonwealth (1995) 183 CLR 
373 per joint majority at 418, 437, 438, 480; Wik Peoples v Queensland (1996) 187 CLR 1 per 
Brennan CJ at 71, 72, 84, 87, 88, 91, 98, Toohey J at 120, Gaudron J at 140, 154, 166, Gummow J at 
176, 183, Kirby J at 213-14, 216, 217, 218, 237, 245, 246 (and note particularly Toohey and Kirby JJ’s 
general preference for the phrase ‘traditional title’: at 101, 205); Fejo v Northern Territory (1998) 195 
CLR 96 per joint majority at 114, 126, 128, 130, Kirby J at 148, 153; Yanner v Eaton (1999) 201 CLR 
351 per joint majority at 361-2, 371, 372-3, Gummow J at 381-5, 396, Callinan J at 401, 402-3, 407, 
408-10.  See also Commonwealth v Yarmirr (2001) 184 ALR 113 per joint majority at 117, 121, 128, 
130, 138, 143, McHugh J at 146, 147, 154, 160, 166, 167, 170, 171, 174, 177, Kirby J at 185, 191, 192, 
193, 195, 196-7, 199, 201, 203, 205, Callinan J at 205; Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Com-
munity v Victoria [1998] FCA 1606 per Olney J at [121], [129]; Western Australia v Ward (2000) 99 
FCR 316 per Beaumont and von Doussa JJ at 382; and ultimately Western Australia v Ward (2002) 
213 CLR 1 per joint majority at [17]ff, [47], [53], [64], [82], [85]ff, [111], [192], [194], [219], [220], 
[383], [388], [468], Kirby J at [570], [574]-[575], Callinan J at [638], [968]; Members of the Yorta Yorta 
Aboriginal Community v Victoria (2002) 214 CLR 422 per Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Hayne JJ at 
[31], [33], [35], [37], [39]-[42], [44]ff, [75], [76], Gaudron and Kirby JJ at [105]. 
 and terminology of the courts, and by the pattern of litigation and strategies of the 
parties.
71
  There was, for some time at least, an element of accident in the 
development of the Australian constrictions – and certainly little close 
consideration of the methodological options.  Clearer critical thinking was no 
doubt further discouraged by the legal orderliness and superficial cultural relativity 
of a strictly-drawn ‘traditional laws and customs’ framework, and indeed by the 
convenience of the stricter reading for a society struggling with the awkwardly late 
arrival of the Mabo doctrine and its ‘second wave’ in Wik.72   
 
Encouragements and discouragements aside, the ostensible advance of the stricter 
thinking came in various forms.  At a practical level, the specific ‘tradition’-
focused mindset on content was nudged along by important lower court 
determinations which carefully itemised historically-based activities in the 
description of subsisting interests (or excluded non-historical ones),
73
 generically 
qualified the rights and interests listed (eg ‘in accordance with and subject to … 
traditional laws and customs’),74 and/or expressly confined the recognised right to 
use and enjoy resources to ‘traditional’ resources.75   
 
On a more theoretical level, the strict approach was at least implicitly supported in 
the keen adoption of terms such as ‘usufructuary’ and ‘sui generis’ in descriptions 
of the Aboriginal interest, in continuing reference to its variability and difference 
from common law interests, and in the emerging prominent use of the ‘bundle of 
rights’ analogy.  In many instances the relevant comments can be explained and/or 
rationalised without damage to the possibility of a comprehensive native title 
interest, however there were on occasion more explicit statements in apparent 
support of the strict ‘tradition’-focused confinement of content (notably, 
comments by Toohey J in Wik,
76
 Gummow J in Yanner
77
 and lower court judges in 
Yarmirr
78
).  These statements were expressed in general terms, and provided 
significant fuel for the narrowing of Australian principle, but what they in fact 
                                                 
71  For a more detailed analysis, see Simon Young, The Trouble with Tradition: Native Title and Cultural 
Change (Federation Press, NSW, 2008), chap 11 and [12.1]. 
72  Wik Peoples v Queensland (1996) 187 CLR 1. 
73  See eg Yarmirr v Northern Territory (1998) 82 FCR 533 per Olney J at 601-2.  Cf also the more recent 
decisions in De Rose v South Australia [2002] FCA 1342 per O’Loughlin J (eg at [922]); Daniel v 
Western Australia [2003] FCA 666; Lardil Peoples v Queensland [2004] FCA 298 (eg at [194]ff) and 
Sampi v Western Australia [2005] FCA 777 (eg at [10]).  
74  See the trial determination in Yarmirr v Northern Territory (1998) 82 FCR 533; cf Western Australia v 
Ward (2000) 99 FCR 316 per Beaumont and von Doussa JJ at 372, 373 (discussed below). And cf De 
Rose v South Australia [2002] FCA 1342 per O’Loughlin J at [922]; Daniel v Western Australia 
[2003] FCA 666; Daniel v Western Australia [2005] FCA 536; Lardil Peoples v Queensland [2004] 
FCA 298 at [194]ff; Gumana v Northern Territory (No 2) [2005] FCA 1425; Sampi v Western Australia 
(No 3) [2005] FCA 1716.   
75  See eg Western Australia v Ward (2000) 99 FCR 316 per Beaumont and von Doussa JJ at 449-55, 542-
3, 483.    
76  Wik Peoples v Queensland (1996) 187 CLR 1 at 126. 
77  Yanner v Eaton (1999) 201 CLR 351 at 384. 
78  Yarmirr v Northern Teritory (1998) 82 FCR 533 at 576-7 per Olney J; Commonwealth v Yarmirr (1999) 
101 FCR 171 at 226 per Beaumont and von Doussa JJ. 
 illustrate is the troublesome absence of a clear title v rights distinction in the 
Australian jurisprudence (in the latter context a particularisation of traditional laws 
and customs is necessary and appropriate).
79
 
 
There were, on the other hand, glimpses of more liberal thinking on content spread 
through the formative cases.  These came in various forms - eg: ongoing 
acknowledgement of the possibility of a full ‘title’ (particularly in the strong lower 
court judgments of Lee J and North J in Ward);
80
 momentary retreat from the 
insistent ‘point of sovereignty’ focus (with some correlative softening of the 
notion of ‘tradition’);81 and renewed attention to the critical concept of 
exclusivity.
82
  Ultimately, perhaps prompted by this new focus on exclusivity, 
Kirby J in the Yarmirr High Court decision began to assemble a coherent 
opposition to the strict thinking – emphasising the economics of Indigenous land 
use, the fragility of specifically-defined rights, the inevitability and desirability of 
cultural ‘evolution’, and the injustice of historicalising the Aboriginal interest (at 
least where original exclusivity is established).
83
   
 
In terms of proof, and the development of a strict tradition-focussed approach to 
continuity, prominent statements in Fejo
84
 (later adopted in Yarmirr
85
) emphasised 
the need for survival of traditional laws and customs in broad terms.  However, the 
formative cases also produced more explicit support for a particularised approach.  
There were (once again) specific-rights bred comments phrased with undiscerning 
generality,
86
 an early ambiguous High Court hint that claimants must remain 
‘living in a traditional society’,87 and a preview of the emerging emphasis on the 
survival of the Aboriginal ‘system’88 (with its implications of particularity).   
                                                 
79  Toohey J’s critical comment was actually a quote from the Canadian decision of Van der Peet v R 
(1996) 137 DLR (4th) 289 (clearly a specific rights-type scenario), the Yanner decision (the context 
for Gummow J’s comment) was itself clearly a specific rights-type case, and it must be 
remembered that in the Yarmirr litigation the courts had rejected (rightly or wrongly) the claims 
to original exclusivity over the relevant areas – a finding that would justify the handling of the 
matter as a species of specific rights claim. 
80  Western Australia v Commonwealth (1995) 183 CLR 373 eg at 450; Yanner v Eaton (1999) 201 CLR 351 
at 372-3; Wik Peoples v Queensland (1996) 187 CLR 1 at 126-7 per Toohey J, at 169 per Gummow J; 
Ward v Western Australia (1998) 159 ALR 483 at 505ff per Lee J; Western Australia v Ward (2000) 99 
FCR 316 at 346, 372-4 per Beaumont and von Doussa JJ, at 515, 526ff per North J. 
81  Commonwealth v Yarmirr (1999) 101 FCR 171 per Beaumont and von Doussa JJ.  Their Honours 
suggested that the particular date of sovereignty was not critical, and interpreted the notion of 
‘tradition’ as ‘the handing down of statements, beliefs, legends, customs etc from generation to 
generation, especially by word of mouth or practice’: at 194.  However note their ultimate 
substituted emphasis upon the ‘point of contact’: eg at 194-5. 
82  Commonwealth v Yarmirr (2001) 184 ALR 113. 
83  Commonwealth v Yarmirr (2001) 184 ALR 113 per Kirby J esp at 186, 196-7, 205. 
84  Fejo v Northern Territory (1998) 195 CLR 96 at 128. 
85  Commonwealth v Yarmirr (2001) 184 ALR 113 at 120-1. 
86  See eg Mason v Tritton (1994) 34 NSWLR 572 esp at 598 per Priestley JA. 
87  Western Australia v Commonwealth (1995) 183 CLR 373 at 452 (later quoted by Brennan CJ in Wik 
Peoples v Queensland (1996) 187 CLR 1 at 92).  Cf Wik (1996, HCt) per Kirby J at 233, 248; 
Commonwealth v Yarmirr (2001) 184 ALR 113 per Kirby J at 205. 
88  Commonwealth v Yarmirr (2001) 184 ALR 113 at 128. 
  
Olney J in the Yorta Yorta trial decision
89
 demonstrated the significance of the 
crystallising restrictiveness (and some of the attending evidential dangers) when 
he traced the long struggle of the Yorta Yorta people with a tone of particularity 
and declared that the ‘tide of history’ had ‘washed away’ any real 
acknowledgement and observance of their traditional laws and customs.
90
  And 
O’Loughlin J in De Rose,91 despite showing signs of flexibility on certain 
matters,
92
 crafted the strictest application of the overly particular approach to proof 
yet seen – with the aid of the Yorta Yorta lower court precedents, an emphasis 
upon the duality of the s 223(1) requirements,
93
 and an inattention to the general 
judicial de-emphasis on contemporary physical presence.
94
      
 
However, in the case of proof also, more liberal thinking shadowed the strict.  
Confirmation of the potential sufficiency of a mere ‘spiritual connection’ itself 
goes someway towards contradicting a strict and particular approach to continuity.  
Yet there were more directly relevant signs of liberality in the formative cases - 
such as: support for what might be termed a ‘compartmental’ approach to proof 
(requiring constancy and continuity of only the relevant laws and customs);
95
 
some revival of Brennan J’s ameliorating terminology from Mabo (No 2);96 actual 
attempted accommodation of change or interruption (particularly where it was 
western-induced);
97
 calls for evidential caution;
98
 cogitation (as noted above) on 
the point of sovereignty focus;
99
 and (very importantly for the arguments in this 
paper) support for a more generalised connection focus.
100
   
                                                 
89  Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria [1998] FCA 1606. 
90  Esp at [129].  The Full Federal Court in the appeal expressed some concern about Olney J’s focus, 
however the majority did find the discontinuity here to be sufficient to defeat the claim: Members 
of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria (2001) 110 FCR 244 per Branson and Katz JJ. 
91  De Rose v South Australia [2002] FCA 1342. 
92  Ie receptivity to migratory movements (see eg at [316], [345]-[346], [372], [376]; contrast 
Harrington-Smith on behalf of the Wongatha People v Western Australia (No 9) [2007] FCA 31 at [301]ff, 
[520]ff, [704], [1167]), and changes in the traditional law and custom governing individual respon-
sibilities and entitlements (eg at [89], [102]). 
93  Eg De Rose v South Australia [2002] FCA 1342 at [561].  This point is discussed further below. 
94  Notwithstanding his express reference to the important preceding statements: see eg at [567]-
[569]. 
95  Mason v Tritton (1994) 34 NSWLR 572 at 601 per Priestley JA, at 584 per Kirby P.  Cf Derschaw v 
Sutton (1997) 17 WAR 419 per Franklyn J at 423ff; Commonwealth v Yarmirr (1999) 101 FCR 171 per 
Merkel J at 256. 
96  Wilkes v Johnsen (1999) 21 WAR 269 at 286; Ward v Western Australia (1998) 159 ALR 483 eg at 501-2 
per Lee J; Western Australia v Ward (2000) 99 FCR 316 at 378, 381, 384-7, 421 per Beaumont and von 
Doussa JJ; Commonwealth v Yarmirr (1999) 101 FCR 171 per Merkel J. 
97  Ward v Western Australia (1998) 159 ALR 483 per Lee J eg at 501-2, 514-6, 535-6, 539-41.  Cf Rubibi 
Community v Western Australia (2001) 112 FCR 409 per Merkel J at 441-2; Commonwealth v Yarmirr 
(1999) 101 FCR 171 per Merkel J esp at 249, 254, 255-6, 258-9; Commonwealth v Yarmirr (2001) 184 
ALR 113 per Kirby J at 197. 
98  Eg Members of Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria (2001) 110 FCR 244 per Black CJ. 
99  Commonwealth v Yarmirr (1999) 101 FCR 171 per Beaumont and von Doussa JJ. 
100  Wilkes v Johnsen (1999) 21 WAR 269 per Wheeler J; Commonwealth v Yarmirr (1999) 101 FCR 171 per 
Merkel J; Commonwealth v Yarmirr (2001) 184 ALR 113 per Kirby J at 201-2. 
  
The most prominent challenge to the strict thinking during this period came in 
Black CJ’s dissent from the Full Federal Court’s upholding of the trial result in 
Yorta Yorta.
101
  His Honour was insistent upon the need to accommodate 
change,
102
 and adopted a liberal interpretation of the concept of ‘tradition’ in the 
statutory criteria.  He emphasised that while the relevant ‘tradition’ for the 
purposes of s 223 must at least have its ‘roots’ in the law and customs that 
provided the foundation for the native title as at the acquisition of sovereignty, it 
was wrong to see ‘traditional’ as, of its nature, a concept concerned with what is 
‘dead, frozen or otherwise incapable of change’.103 
 
 
The Ward and Yorta Yorta decisions 
 
Whilst the issues under examination in this paper were touched upon at various 
points in the formative High Court jurisprudence, they only arose clearly and 
specifically before that Court in the Ward
104
 and Yorta Yorta
105
 decisions of 2002.  
While these decisions were not definitive on the relevant matters, the judgments 
were in various ways very important to the ongoing development of the strict 
‘tradition’-focus.    
 
The Ward decision, concerning a large and important claim in the East Kimberley 
region, is principally significant on the question of content.  The existence of 
native title and its definition were not the main focus of the appeal to the High 
Court, however there was important comment on the latter issue.  The joint 
majority judges
106
 expressed respect for the Aboriginal perspective and the multi-
dimensional nature of native title,
107
 however in the detail of their decision they 
appear to have reinforced (in a number of ways) the overly-specific ‘tradition’-
focussed approach to content.  The reasoning offered in support of this approach 
here came in various forms (in part reminiscent of comments in earlier decisions 
and in part essentially new):   
 the judges downplay the significance of the right to be asked for 
‘permission’ and the right to ‘speak for’ country, and in so doing 
apparently resist any attribution of real significance to them as possible 
markers of a comprehensive interest;
108
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  they similarly downplay the acknowledgement and broad translation of 
such traditional notions by the general law (as a right to possess, occupy, 
use and enjoy land to the exclusion of all others) – and hence appear to 
sideline important indications that both the common law and the Native 
Title Act contemplate the possible existence of a comprehensive, exclusive 
Aboriginal entitlement;
109
  
 they support the ‘fragmented’ view of the Aboriginal land relationship via 
a new emphasis on the statutory phrase ‘rights and interests’ (and a 
correlative dismissal of ‘duties and obligations’) in the translation 
process;
110
 and 
 they support their approach with references to the often-cited ‘difference’ 
of native title from general common law interests.
111
 
 
From a full reading of the judgment, it appears that the joint majority felt that 
paricularisation of native title content was important to the workings of partial 
extinguishment (and more specifically that it was important to differentiate and 
distance the specific incidents of native title from any fragile rights of control).
112
  
However, this assumes that the notion of partial extinguishment depends upon a 
particularised original definition of the interest.
113
  And moreover, the effect of this 
overly-specific reasoning on content obviously runs deeper than the facilitation of 
extinguishment theories.    
 
Armed with their apparent preference for definitional specificity, the joint majority 
criticised the suggestion by the claimants’ counsel that native title will often be a 
communal title which is ‘practically equivalent to full ownership’,114 and directed 
a similar comment to the dissenting Full Federal Court judge (North J) in 
addressing his alternative approach to extinguishment.
115
  They also criticised the 
primary judge in Ward (Lee J) for his lack of specificity in identifying the native 
title entitlements in question
116
 and his apparent attempt to derive a communal 
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 native title essentially from ‘occupation’ of the area at sovereignty.117  Perhaps 
most significantly, the joint majority judges dismissed the possibility of mineral 
entitlements on the basis (even aside from questions of extinguishment) that there 
had been no traditional Aboriginal law, custom or use relating to such 
substances.
118
  This brief holding (on an important question) appears to be a simple 
illustrative extension of the judges’ preference for a strict and specific tradition-
focused approach to native title content.    
 
By the time of the High Court decision in Ward, Kirby J’s opposition to the strict 
view of content had firmed, and was presenting a cohesive alternative to the 
apparent strictness of the majority.  His Honour noted that the object of the Native 
Title Act was ‘the recognition of “native title”, rather than the provision of a list of 
activities permitted on, or in relation to, areas of land or waters’.  Building upon 
the dissent of North J in the Full Federal Court below, Kirby J emphasised the 
need for the law to accommodate change and development in traditional laws and 
customs, and recognise the possibility of ‘new aspects’ of tradition rights and 
interests developing.  And he considered, on the basis of principles of equality, 
that where a community’s native title is established as conferring possession, 
occupation, use and enjoyment of the land and waters to the exclusion of others, 
there must be a presumption that such right carries with it the use and enjoyment 
of minerals and like resources (without the need for a separate inquiry regarding 
the identity of those resources).
119
  These are highly significant comments from the 
perspective of the arguments in this paper.
120
 
 
Ward was followed quickly by the High Court decision in Yorta Yorta.
121
  This 
claim related to the early-settled and now intensively used Murray River area, and 
squarely raised for examination the circumstances of a claimant community that 
had been subjected to prolonged western influence and disruption.  From the 
perspective of this paper, the Yorta Yorta decision was to proof what Ward was to 
content. 
 
In Yorta Yorta, Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Hayne JJ emphasised the idea of an 
‘intersection’ between traditional law and custom and the common law – and the 
importance of identifying exactly what traditional law and custom so intersects. 
They explained that the source of native title rights and interests was a ‘normative’ 
Aboriginal ‘system’,122 which was unable to validly create new rights, duties or 
interests after the acquisition of sovereignty.
123
  It was said therefore that the only 
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 rights or interests (not sourced in the new sovereign order) that will now be 
recognised are those that find their origin in pre-sovereignty law and custom.
124
  
Section 223(1), their Honours felt, should be construed in this light.  They 
considered that as there was general acceptance that the Act does not create new 
rights and interests but rather refers to rights and interests with an origin in pre-
sovereignty law and custom,
125
 the term ‘traditional’ in s 223(1)(a) and (b) must be 
read as referring not only to generational transmission but also as conveying an 
understanding of the age of the ‘traditions’: only the normative rules of pre-
sovereignty Indigenous societies are ‘traditional’ laws and customs.126  
 
This rationalisation has obvious significance on the issue of content.  This is an 
emphatic re-confirmation of the ‘point of sovereignty’ approach,127 and this and 
various other comments
128
 indicate that their Honours did not intend to 
accommodate any post-sovereignty emergence or accretion of rights via change in 
law and custom.
129
  However, the contention in this paper that it is not the point of 
sovereignty approach (even in such emphatic terms) but rather over-specificity 
that is the source of the difficulty as regards content.  And viewed from that 
perspective, the main significance of these comments from Yorta Yorta lies in the 
implicit support for over-specificity found in the juxtaposition of notions of 
‘tradition’, ‘normativity’ and ‘system’.130 
 
More importantly for the issue of proof, their Honours went on to identify (with 
reference to s 223) a requirement that the normative system under which the rights 
and interests are possessed (the traditional laws and customs) must be a system 
that has had a ‘continuous existence and vitality’ since sovereignty131 - otherwise 
the rights and interests owing their existence to it will have ceased to exist, and 
revived adherence to the former system will not ‘reconstitute’ the traditional laws 
and customs out of which rights and interests must ‘spring’ under the definition of 
native title.
132
  In explaining this position, their Honours emphasised that laws and 
customs ‘do not exist in a vacuum’, and pointed to the close connection between 
‘law and custom’ and the ‘society’ that they ‘arise out of and, in important 
respects, go to define’.133  Accordingly, survival of the ‘society’ is necessary,134 
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 and later re-adoption of the content of former laws and customs by some new 
society makes them laws and customs of that new post-sovereignty society – and 
hence they can not support recognisable native title rights and interests.
135
 
 
This new thinking in Yorta Yorta does not expressly affirm the specific tradition-
focused approach to proof.
136
  However, it does provide significant terminological 
and conceptual support for that stricter thinking.  This comes particularly in the 
emphasis on the necessary survival of a normative ‘system’ (which implies detail 
and completeness) and in the introduction and apparently strict interpretation of 
the notion of ‘society’.  Indeed, the relevant passages could be viewed as prof-
fering a new theoretical justification for the strict approach - particularly when 
combined with the Ward joint majority’s emphasis on the duality of the 
requirements in s 223(1) paras (a) (rights and interests possessed under traditional 
laws and customs) and (b) (connection by those laws and customs)).
137
  Yet it 
would seem that there are difficulties in the Yorta Yorta reasoning; immediate 
ones (eg in the juxtaposition of confirming nullification of the Aboriginal system 
and insisting on its continued ‘existence and vitality’)138 and more complex ones 
(eg in the interposition and interpretation of the notion of ‘society’).139  
 
Not surprisingly, given this difficult conceptual base, Gleeson CJ, Gummow and 
Hayne JJ responded tentatively to specific questions about change and 
interruption.
140
  It was suggested that ‘some’ change and adaptation in traditional 
law and custom, or ‘some’ interruption in the enjoyment or exercise of rights and 
interests, will ‘not necessarily be fatal’ (but that both together might ‘take on 
considerable significance’).141 Yet the guidance offered on these matters appeared 
to be thin, seeming to just restate the question (‘what is ‘traditional?’) in the case 
                                                                                                               
community requirement: eg Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria (2001) 110 
FCR 244 at 275. Note however that Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Hayne JJ considered that the 
questions in issue turned more upon a proper understanding of para (a) than on para (c): at [12]. 
134  At [50], cf [89]. 
135  Esp at [53], [54], cf [87], [89].  Cf also in this regard Gale (2004, FCt) (esp at [44], [117], [119]). 
136  Compare however Callinan J at [193], [195]. 
137  Western Australia v Ward (2002) 213 CLR 1 at [18], [32].  
138  See also in this context Richard H Bartlett, ‘An Obsession with Traditional Laws and Customs 
Creates Difficulty Establishing Native Title Claims in the South: Yorta Yorta’ (2003) 31 University 
of Western Australia Law Review 35 at 38ff; Daniel Lavery, ‘A Greater Sense of Tradition: The Impli-
cations of the Normative System Principles in Yorta Yorta for Native Title Determination 
Applications’ (2003) 10 Murdoch University Electronic Journal of Law at 24; Lisa Strelein, 
Compromised Jurisprudence (Aboriginal Studies Press, Canberra, 2006) at 128-9. 
139  Compare in this regard Sampi v Western Australia [2005] FCA 777 at [969], [979], [1042]; Northern 
Territory v Alyawarr, Kaytetye, Warumungu, Wakaya Native Title Claim Group [2005] FCAFC 135 at 
[78]. And note the apparently flexible application of the requirement in Jango v Northern Territory 
[2006] FCA 318 esp at [343]ff. Cf also Risk v Northern Territory [2006] FCA 404 esp at [230]ff, [802]ff; 
Bennell v Western Australia (2006) 230 ALR 603 (generally).  For further discussion of the reasoning 
in Yorta Yorta, see Simon Young, The Trouble with Tradition: Native Title and Cultural Change 
(Federation Press, NSW, 2008), pp 324ff. 
140  Members of Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria (2002) 214 CLR 422 at [78]ff. 
141  At [83]. 
 of ‘change’ and re-insert the term ‘substantially’ in the case of interruption (has 
acknowledgement and observance of laws and customs continued ‘substantially 
uninterrupted’?).142  The contention in this paper is that it is the over-
particularisation of ‘tradition’ that produces such awkwardness on these critical 
issues, and that renders the Australian doctrine largely incapable of 
accommodating change and interruption in a logical manner. 
 
Justice Kirby’s strong dissent in Ward (principally on questions of content) had 
implications also for proof, most particularly via its insistence on the need to 
accommodate change.
143
  However, the dissent of Gaudron and Kirby JJ in Yorta 
Yorta addressed the matter of proof more directly.  Their Honours argued that the 
term ‘traditional’ does not necessarily signify rigid adherence to past practices, 
rather it ordinarily signifies ‘handed down from generation to generation’ (often 
by word of mouth).
144
  They suggested that particularly in light of the impact of 
European settlement and the ensuing impracticability of many traditional practices 
(which was acknowledged in the Preamble to the Act), laws and customs may 
properly be described as ‘traditional’ for the purposes of s 223(1) notwithstanding 
that they do not correspond exactly with the laws and customs acknowledged and 
observed prior to European settlement.
145
 
 
Gaudron and Kirby JJ suggested, then, that for laws and customs to be identified 
as ‘traditional’ they should have their ‘origins’ in the past and any differences 
from past practices should constitute ‘adaptations, alterations, modifications or 
extensions made in accordance with the shared values or the customs and practices 
of the people who acknowledge and observe those laws and customs’.146  This 
logic, a notable advance on other judicial attempts to explain how change might be 
measured and judged, obviously stops short of the weightier methodological 
correction argued for in this paper – namely a conceptual restructure entailing an 
acknowledgement that the specific incidents of the traditional Aboriginal lifestyle 
might logically be quite irrelevant to the survival or otherwise of a native ‘title’ 
properly so called (as distinguished from specific rights-type entitlements).  It 
should also be added, however, that Gaudron and Kirby JJ adopted a more 
flexible, variable and self-identifying notion of ‘society’ (or ‘community’) than the 
joint majority judges (the existence of which they apparently saw as a necessary 
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 foundation for laws and customs and their adaptation).
147
  This is a point of some 
significance given the conceptual peril attending the new ‘survival of society’ 
emphasis if it is applied with reference to an overly static notion of ‘society’.  
 
Ironically, the joint majority in Yorta Yorta (and indeed Callinan J in his separate 
and otherwise quite exacting reasoning) touched upon another potentially 
liberalising line of logic that has also surfaced briefly in other cases.  There was 
reference to the possibility that alteration, ‘development’ and/or interruption in 
traditional law and custom might be accommodated where it was contemplated by 
the traditional law and custom.
148
  This is a potentially very significant angle for 
claimants, if all else fails, however it comes with problems: an implicit 
confirmation of the unacceptability of non-contemplated change and interruption 
(harsh given the realities of western impact); uncertainty and indeterminacy in 
application (what exactly must be contemplated?); and some disharmony with the 
Yorta Yorta majority’s insistence on the legal nullification of the ‘parallel law-
making system’ at sovereignty.149      
 
 
The Contemporary Lower Court Response 
 
The reasoning and determinations in the Ward and Yorta Yorta decisions have 
failed to produce consistency and coherency in the subsequent lower court cases, 
which was perhaps inevitable given the High Court’s apparent drift towards the 
problematically exacting and imprecise microscoping methodology.  Some of the 
later decisions appear to have embraced the stricter thinking, occasionally even 
tightening it further (as regards one or both of proof and content).
150
  On the other 
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 hand, some of the lower court judges have found openings of sorts in the reasoning 
and standards laid down above.   
 
In the case of content, signs of more flexible thinking include an apparent attempt 
to accommodate rights or interests arising from change or adaptation in laws and 
customs
151
 - which is notable, although not the type of structural correction argued 
for in this paper.  More importantly for present purposes, there have been some 
close approaches to a proper acknowledgement of the possible existence of a 
comprehensive native title interest, albeit for the most part
152
 with last-minute 
distraction by the Yarmirr offshore limitations
153
 and/or an absolutist approach to 
extinguishment of exclusivity (according to which the remnants of a partially 
extinguished title apparently lose the definitional assistance of the original 
exclusivity and fall out piñata style as specifically-defined rights).
154
  In view of 
the repeating appearance of these last obstacles, it is worth noting that on at least 
one occasion there has been brief recognition that alternative views may be taken 
on the effects of extinguishment of ‘exclusivity’.155 
 
In the case of proof, recent lower court attempts at some liberalisation of the 
framework laid down in Yorta Yorta have come in various forms: 
 expressions of preference for a non-segmented approach to 
‘connection’,156 opposition to the need for a rigorous independent 
‘connection’ test (on top of the traditional rights and interests inquiry),157 
and re-emphasis upon the absence of a continuing physical connection 
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 requirement
158
 – all of which tend to dismantle possible rationalisations 
for an overly-particular tradition focus as regards proof;  
 emphasis upon continuity in simple knowledge of and assertion of 
entitlement, boundaries and locations
159
 (rather than maintenance of 
lifestyle and particular practices); 
 rejection of any requirement of uniform observance and acknowledgement 
of laws and customs within the claim group;
160
  
 acknowledgment and taking account of European interference with, and 
the impracticalities of continuing, certain traditional practices;
161
 and 
 positive accommodation of some actual change in practice (albeit for the 
most part in uncontroversial contexts).
162
 
 
The controversial first instance decision in Bennell
163
 was an important addition to 
this Federal Court exploration of the boundaries of the strict thinking on proof.  
Interestingly, Wilcox J in this decision focused principally on the Yorta Yorta-bred 
survival of ‘society’ requirement - which illustrates the potential of this new 
emphasis to take on an important role in the inquiry.  However, in the face of 
considerable community change in the relevant area (around the Perth region), and 
the loss of many traditional practices, his Honour tempered the particularised 
approach to proof in a range of ways.  Once again there were explicit attempts to 
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 accommodate community change in a variety of contexts,
164
 but various other 
aspects of Wilcox J’s reasoning also warrant mention:  
 he expressly accommodated difference and dissent within the relevant 
group;
165
 
 he apparently distinguished the inquiry into continuation of a ‘society’ 
from a general search for unchanged laws and customs, indicating in his 
society inquiry that he was merely seeking continued acknowledgement of 
‘some’ traditional laws and customs;166 
 he clearly emphasised the ‘communal/inter se’ distinction,167 with the 
implication that his inquiry into inter se rules was only relevant to the 
survival of ‘society’ and existence of ‘normative system’ requirements;168 
and 
 on turning to the actual survival of native title interests, he adopted what is 
termed here the ‘compartmental’ approach to proof, requiring only 
continuity in the law and custom underpinning the surviving native title 
rights.
169
 
 
In Bodney v Bennell,
170
 however, the Full Federal Court commented on various 
aspects of Wilcox J’s approach, finding specific error in two respects (with 
reference to the terms of s 223(1) of the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth)).  First, it was 
concluded that Wilcox J had failed to properly assess whether there had been 
continuous acknowledgement and observance of the traditional laws and customs 
by the Noongar society from sovereignty until recent times.  In this regard, it was 
suggested that he had conducted an inquiry into continuity of society largely 
divorced from inquiry into continuity of the pre-sovereignty normative system, an 
approach that the Full Court said ‘may mask unacceptable change with the 
consequence that the current rights and interests are no longer those that existed at 
sovereignty, and thus not traditional’.171  Secondly, the Full Court found error in 
Wilcox J’s assessment of the claimants’ ‘connection’, concluding that he had 
erroneously assumed that the establishment of a connection with the larger 
Noongar claim area meant there was necessarily a connection with the smaller 
separated portion to which this specific determination was directed.  It would 
appear that these objections to the trial decision reflect not so much paradigm 
differences in approach, but rather just a dissatisfaction on the part of the Full 
Court with Wilcox J’s evidential inferences, deliberate receptivity to change, and 
perceived lack of rigour in the relevant inquiries.     
 
                                                 
164 See eg at [729], [758], [773]ff, [784]ff. 
165 See eg at [601], [753]ff, [764]ff, [779], [787].  
166 See eg at [776], [791]. Cf Harrington-Smith on behalf of the Wongatha People v Western Australia (No 9) 
[2007] FCA 31 at [962]ff. 
167 See particularly at [61]ff, [78], [794]-[795]. 
168 See particularly at [601], [764]ff. 
169 See particularly at [800].   
170  Bodney v Bennell [2008] FCAFC 63. 
171  At [74]. 
 Detailed analysis of the appeal court’s reasoning is beyond the scope of this 
paper,
172
 suffice to say that particularity was to some extent re-tightened and doubt 
was cast upon some of the liberalising tools employed by Wilcox J (identified 
above).  Notably, it was said in passing that Wilcox J had erroneously relied upon 
the reasons for particular change (namely specific western interference) in 
mitigation of that change.  This was thought to be impermissible under the Yorta 
Yorta precedent
173
 - although, as the above examination suggests, opinion is 
apparently divided on this point in the recent Australian case law.  It might also be 
noted that the Full Court emphasised that the inquiry into ‘connection’ should not 
be fused or confused with the inquiry into the existence of rights and interests 
under s 223(1)(a)
174
 – once again a matter on which the recent cases are apparently 
divided.   
 
Looking beyond the appeal decision in Bodney v Bennell, it is clear that the Federal 
Court judges have in recent years opened some significant cracks in the restrictive 
‘tradition’-focused approach to proof.  Moreover, on the issue of content (where 
perhaps much of the predilection for particularity begins) there continues to be 
incremental conceptual progress – off the back of strong earlier dissents such as 
those by North J and Kirby J.  Yet at this juncture it must be conceded that the 
High Court reasoning and tone in Ward and Yorta Yorta remains weighty in its 
practical and theoretical encouragement for the stricter and more specific tradition-
focused methodology. 
 
 
Conclusion… and a note on Consequences 
 
A principled solution to the Australian difficulties can be found in the less-visited 
corners of the Australian case law, the unsorted lessons of the comparative law, and 
the persistent voices of commentary.  On the particular arguments advanced in this 
paper, the beginnings of a solution – the ‘de-particularisation’ of the Australian 
methodology – lie in a proper recognition of the logical conceptual distinctions 
between ‘rights’ and ‘title’ and between ‘communal’ and ‘inter se’ interests.  These 
distinctions allow a communal title claim to be freed from the specificity of 
specific rights and inter se type inquiries.  A finding of exclusive occupation (under 
traditional law and custom) at sovereignty, together with substantial continuity in 
the relevant law and custom (in essence the traditionally-based assertion of 
‘ownership’ or ‘custodianship’175), supports the recognition of a contemporary 
                                                 
172  For further analysis by this author, see ‘One step forward and one step back: The Noongar south-
west native title claim’ (2008) 23(2) Australian Property Law Bulletin 14; ‘Tides of History and 
Jurisprudential Gulfs: Native Title Proof and the Noongar Western Australia Claim’ (2009) 8(1) 
Indigenous Law Journal (Toronto) - forthcoming. 
173  At [81], [82], [96]ff.  Cf Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria (2002) 214 CLR 
422 per the joint majority esp at [90]-[91]. 
174  At [165]. 
175  Which may of course be evidenced in part by reference to specific historical and contemporary 
practices. 
 interest permitting a range of uses (subject to specific or complete extinguishment) 
and continuing exclusivity (subject to specific or general qualification).
176
    
 
Much of the analysis in this paper has proceeded in the legal abstract, at times 
descending to semantics.  However it is very clear that these issues have enormous 
significance for Indigenous Australians, and for the viability of the native title 
doctrine as the new cornerstone of the post-colonial legal relationship in Australia.  
The consequences of an overly strict ‘tradition’ focus have been explored in legal 
and political commentary, and in some of the more progressive (usually dissenting) 
judgments, however it is appropriate to highlight the general nature of the problems 
here.
177
      
 
An overly-specific ‘tradition’-focused approach to the definition of native title 
builds unnecessary complications and dissonance into Australian property law, 
inevitably fuels an ongoing dismantling of Indigenous relationships with land, and 
hinders the participation of Aboriginal communities in the general economy.  An 
overly-particular ‘tradition’-focused approach to proof (ie cultural continuity) sets 
up a hazy and subjective legal scaling of different Aboriginal communities based 
upon western observations of western interference, rejects the claims of those 
peoples most severely so affected, and tends to institutionally denigrate attempts at 
some cultural revival.  It must necessarily be inconsistent with continuing external 
pressures on Indigenous communities to adapt and participate, and intrusively 
examines the internal Aboriginal society without due regard for the risks of 
disruption and miscomprehension.  Perhaps most unsatisfactorily, it makes a loss 
of tradition both a product and a cause of dispossession.
178
 
 
The strict ‘tradition’ focus, in its whole operation, unpicks the enormous potential 
of this most important phase in Australian legal history.  It constructs and secures 
an opening premise that little native title now exists, and a reductionist view of 
that which does.  It terminologically and structurally obstructs any meaningful 
legal accommodation of change in Indigenous communities.  It crowds 
determination and mediation processes with unnecessary uncertainty and 
evidential complexity.  And it ensures that over time the whole concept of ‘native 
title’ is likely to be decreasingly relevant to the management of the post-colonial 
legal relationship in Australia. 
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